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ARGUMENT

I.

The

State tries in vain t0 avoid dealing with the substance 0f Mr. Hairston’s compelling

claims by invoking a procedural defense that
Brief,

is

both waived and unavailing. See Answering

ﬁled Sept. 26, 2019 (hereinafter “Ans. BL”),

at

6—17. Then, 0n the merits, the State

misconstrues both the nature of Mr. Hairston’s claims and the applicable law. See

The

State’s efforts fall short

The

A.

The
and

at

0n both

State’s Timeliness Defense Fails

its

theory

The

State

Waived

Its

waived,

Timeliness Defense

Because the State’s position on timeliness
articulated below,

it is

in this appeal

was not even remotely

waived.

In post-conviction proceedings, “the time bar 0f the statute 0f limitations

may be waived if it is not pleaded by the

110 (2000).1 That principal

is

id.,

Which holds

Stuart

II),

149 Idaho 35, 42 (2010).

State (Stuart

defendant.” Cole

v.

is

an afﬁrmative

State, 135

Idaho 107,

rooted in the fact that untimeliness “does not result in a

jurisdictional defect,”

v.

is

meritless.

1.

defense that

17—42.

fronts.

State contends that Mr. Hairston’s petition is time-barred, but

any rate

id. at

true 0f capital post-conviction cases in particular, see

For the ﬁrst time 0n appeal, the State maintains that Mr. Hairston’s claims are barred
because they were not raised Within forty—two days 0f When they were available, as required by

1

In this brief, unless otherwise noted, all internal quotation

all

emphasis

is

added.

marks and

citations are omitted

and

Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)(a). See Ans. Br. at 11–17. The problem for the State is that it never
said anything like that in the district court. There is no reference to Idaho Code § 19-2719 in any
pleading filed by the State below. That includes, most significantly, the State’s answer to the
amended petition and the dismissal papers regarding that pleading. See R. 725–36. In the entire
course of the proceedings in the trial court, the State only even mentioned § 19-2719 twice. It
did so in the following passing remarks at oral argument before the district judge: “[W]e would
move to dismiss under Idaho Code 19-2719 and submit that the Court does lack jurisdiction in
this case. I don’t think 2719 is a mechanism to bypass all standards for Post Conviction Relief.”
Tr. 14. There is not the slightest indication in that vague statement that the prosecutor believed
the claims were precluded by the forty-two-day rule. Indeed, he did not breathe a word, either in
writing or at the argument, about the forty-two-day provision at all. Nor did he ever cite the subsections that gave birth to the forty-two-day limit, § 19-2719(3), (5)(a), or the case that fixed that
specific amount of time, see Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727 (2008), or any of the decisions
that later enforced it, see, e.g., Dunlap v. State, 159 Idaho 280, 293 (2015); Fields v. State, 155
Idaho 532, 535 (2013).
Furthermore, a bare reference to § 19-2719 as a whole plainly does not preserve an
argument that a petition is precluded by a very particular rule codified in a very particular subsection of that statute. As confirmed by the heading of the statute, it deals with “[s]pecial
appellate and post-conviction procedure for capital cases.” Thus, it governs all capital postconviction actions. In a sense, then, every motion to dismiss a capital post-conviction petition is
brought pursuant to § 19-2719. That does not mean that every such motion maintains that the

2

petition

is late

---

Gonzales,

under the forty—two-day

Idaho

---,

450 P.3d

rule,

Which

it

that the prosecutor’s

See Ans. Br.

at 12.

[W]e

motion clearly did

is

comments

are not here

at oral

—

Tr.

and

argument sufﬁciently covered the forty—two-day time

the Court

we

is

bar.

make new law based 0n ABA2

not here t0

have, the Idaho Supreme Court and the

that the Petitioner cited that

cruel

in passing

In particular, the State points t0 the following passage:

authorities that

.

v.

faces a serious preservation problem, the State ﬁrst suggests preemptively

come

nothing compelling or controlling has

.

See State

not preserved for appeal.”).

resolutions or standards being applied in other jurisdictions.

.

not.

320 (2019) (“[A]n issue only mentioned

3 15,

unsupported by any cogent argument or authority
Sensing that

this

out.

The

US

The controlling
Supreme Court,

last really controlling

case

would apply here is R0per,3 from 2005, and that applied

and unusual to under the age of eighteen.

14—1 5. Contrary t0 the State’s unsupported intimation otherwise, this language has no

connection t0 the forty-two-day
limitations, the State

the law. That

is

Slightly

By ruminating 0n the

was merely positing

a merits attack.

more

rule.

It

that

Mr. Hairston’s claim was not a winning one under

bears n0 relationship to the forty-two-day timeline.

plausibly, the State seeks t0 distract

forty-two days and focus instead on the allusions he did

What the

“controlling authorities” and their

State conveniently overlooks there is

Namely, he repeatedly advanced the notion

from the prosecutor’s silence 0n the

make

to timeliness.

See Ans. Br.

what the prosecutor wrote about

that the petition

at 11.

timeliness.

was time-barred under a

statute that

undeniably has no bearing here: Idaho Code § 19-4902(a). In both of the two pleadings the

2

American Bar Association.

3

Roper

v.

Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).

prosecutor used to lodge his timeliness challenge, he looked to § 19-4902(a) and not to § 192719. See R. 726, 731, 734, 736. Section 19-4902(a) provides that a petition must be filed
within one year of the direct appeal concluding. It is part of the Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act, which yields to § 19-2719 in capital cases in the event of a conflict. See Fields,
155 Idaho at 535. Because § 19-4902(a) is at odds with § 19-2719(5) in terms of when the
petition is due, the latter statute is the pertinent one in any capital case. The State confirms as
much on appeal, where it depends solely on § 19-2719(5) and not § 19-4902(a). In overview,
then, the State below offered only the wrong statute on timeliness with the wrong limitations
period. That is not good enough for preservation purposes.
With so little of its own work to use, the State turns to Mr. Hairston’s, stressing that he
analyzed § 19-2719(5) below. See Ans. Br. at 11. As noted earlier, though, timeliness “may be
waived if it is not pleaded by the defendant.” Cole, 135 Idaho at 110. Mr. Hairston has no
obligation to the State to do its job for it. In light of Cole’s rule, the State has to utilize in district
court whatever defenses it wants considered on appeal. It simply did not do so with the fortytwo-day rule.
This Court has recently reaffirmed the importance of strictly construing preservation
requirements and holding them against the State when it does not fulfill them. In State v. Wolfe,
165 Idaho 338, 150 (2019), the prosecutor below chose one angle to defend the lawfulness of a
search under the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, the Attorney General selected another. Not
permissible, this Court concluded, as “[t]he State’s position significantly broaden[ed] and
misrepresent[ed] the argument made by the prosecutor below.” Id. at 151. As the Court

4

explained, “simply stating . . . a general proposition . . . is not enough to raise every specific
theory or principle of law within it.” Id. Moreover, “[a]llowing the State to merely” make a
generic point “without arguing the proper legal theory applicable to the issue at hand would
effectively nullify the State’s burden” to substantiate its position. Id.
Wolfe is directly on point. Just as in that case, the prosecutor here proffered a broad
defense (untimeliness) while selecting a distinct theory for its applicability (the one year noncapital limitations period running from the end of the direct appeal). Just as in that case, the
Attorney General here stuck with the broad defense (untimeliness) while switching on appeal to
a different and equally distinct theory for its applicability (the forty-two day capital limitations
period running from the availability of the claim). Just as in that case, the appellate argument
has been waived, for the “law does not permit parties to swap horses between courts in order to
get a better mount in the Supreme Court.” Id.
Below, the district court correctly discerned that while the State “made generic
statements” about timeliness, it “did not cite to the specific statute governing post-conviction
procedures in capital cases or offer any reasoning to support its claims,” and “did not dispute”
Mr. Hairston’s explanation as to timeliness. R. 771. “The State’s cursory statements” about
timeliness, the district court continued, were inadequate to make out the defense. R. 772. As
established above, the district court’s reasoning was eminently well-founded. There is no basis
for this Court to take up the State’s newfangled timeliness theory.

5

2.

The Petition Was Timely

If the Court does consider the substance of the State’s view on timeliness, that view
should be rebuffed.
At bottom, the State’s timeliness argument has two premises: 1) some of the science
supporting an extension of Roper and its progeny existed more than forty-two days before Mr.
Hairston filed his petition; and 2) inmates in other jurisdictions have been urging similar claims
over the last several years. See Ans. Br. at 12–17. Neither premise gets the State to a finding of
untimeliness.
As for the first point, while it is true that certain studies were conducted before 2018, the
State forgets that science alone does not show an evolving standard of decency. Aside from the
scientific world, the test takes into account the feelings of the legal community and society as a
whole, in part as they can be divined in “the views that have been expressed by respected
professional organizations.” Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 & n.32 (1988) (plurality
opinion). When Thompson struck down the death penalty for those younger than sixteen, it
relied in part on an ABA resolution opposing the practice. See id. That is the precise type of
document at issue now, for Mr. Hairston’s triggering event was ABA Resolution 111, which
implored “each jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment to prohibit the imposition of a death
sentence on or execution of any individual who was 21 years old or younger at the time of the
offense.” R. 280, 660. As per Thompson, the constitutional significance of an ABA resolution
in this context is beyond debate. Further, until the ABA announced in that resolution that late
adolescents “should be exempted from capital punishment,” R. 663, the movement had not yet

6

crystallized into a consensus among informed scientists and lawyers. Importantly, the resolution
was directed at “each jurisdiction that imposes capital punishment,” R. 660, rather than the
limited audience for the sorts of scientific papers the State is fixated on. That made the
resolution a tipping point that gave Mr. Hairston a foundation for his claims, and he could not
legitimately have brought them beforehand.
Even with respect to the science itself, the fact that some research had favored Mr.
Hairston’s claim in earlier years did not demonstrate a “national consensus” on the subject,
Roper, 543 U.S. at 567, which is what an evolving-standards claim must have. The sorts of
sporadic papers referred to by the State are not equivalent to a consensus. Nor can the State even
claim that such papers would speak to the pivotal factor of “state practice.” Roper, 543 U.S. at
563; accord Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 433 (2008) (emphasizing the centrality of
“state activity” in an evolving-standards analysis); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313–17
(2002) (commenting on how a “practice” had become “uncommon” in declaring it prohibited by
the evolving standards of decency). It was the ABA resolution that announced that it was “now
both appropriate and necessary to address the issue of late adolescence and the death penalty
because of the overwhelming legal, scientific, and societal changes of the last three decades.” R.
663; see R. 661 (“In light of this evolution of both the scientific and legal understanding
surrounding young criminal defendants and broader changes to the death penalty landscape, it is
now time for the ABA to revise its dated position and support the exclusion of individuals who
were 21 years old or younger at the time of their crime.”). There is no evidence in the record—
and the Attorney General has not suggested—that any prestigious, nationwide organizations with

7

comparable status to the ABA made any similar declaration before the issuance of Resolution
111. Because that resolution cemented the status of the consensus, it began the ticking of Mr.
Hairston’s clock.
Finding no luck on the actual consensus, the State resorts to the irrelevant fact that capital
defense lawyers were “increasingly making this constitutional claim” in the years preceding Mr.
Hairston’s current post-conviction case. Ans. Br. at 13. However, as the State’s own brief
thoroughly documents, these were cases in which courts overwhelmingly rejected the claim and
found no national consensus in favor of a Roper extension. See id. at 16–17, 23–30. If anything,
these cases confirm that the national consensus did not exist until the ABA resolution was
promulgated, that Mr. Hairston did not until that moment have available to him “sufficient facts
to file the post-conviction proceeding,” Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 727, and that his petition was
consequently timely.
In the same vein, it is also significant that, of all the many decisions denying Roperextension claims cited by the State, it seems that only two of them were published after the ABA
resolution. One did not even mention the ABA resolution, let alone reject it as a basis for the
claim. See generally Commonwealth v. Towles, 208 A.3d 988 (Pa. 2019). And while the other
decision did allude to the resolution and deny the claim, it appeared to do so on the belief that it
was improper for a state high court to reevaluate the Roper cutoff until the U.S. Supreme Court
has, see Foster v. State, 258 So. 3d 1248, 1254 (Fla. 2018), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 152 (2019), a
line of reasoning that Mr. Hairston debunks below, see infra at 14–17. There are no well-

8

reasoned authorities to support the

rej ection

of the

ABA resolution as a proper marker that the

consensus has passed the threshold.

T0
at

validate

its

approach to timeliness, the State presses Pizzuto into service, see Ans. Br.

14—15, but the analogy

reasonable time at issue

is

is

inapt.

The

0n the following

State zeroes in

attempt to prove the claim,” 146 Idaho
a claim that the petitioner

penalty,

is

id. at

was

at

When the

intellectually disabled4

information about the individual that

it is

is

is

be offered in an

Court so clariﬁed, though,

“is

is

an obj ective fact about the person that
id. at

728 (explaining

it.

in the world.

See Hall, 572 U.S.

not fastened to the obsolete but

v.

at

4

now

may acquire meaning

disabled”

is

that

it is

that the

as public opinion

Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 85 (2010)

is

n0

real claim at

follows that, with respect to a Roper-extension claim, “[t]he reasonable time

The Pizzuto Court used

is

708 (reminding

(“Society changes.”). Before circumstances have adequately changed, there

It

how one

necessary to explore the issue exists from that point

becomes enlightened by a humane justice”); Graham

all.

had before

it

and as a result exempt from the death

the core 0f an evolving-standards claim like the one at bar

deﬁned by changing circumstances

Amendment

Will

onset before the age of eighteen). A11 of the

only a matter 0f gathering

By contrast,

all facts that

he has his eighteenth birthday. See

0f the elements of intellectual disability

Eighth

727.

722. Signiﬁcantly, intellectual disability

essentially set in stone after

onward, and

from Pizzuto: “[t]he

the time necessary t0 develop sufﬁcient facts to ﬁle the post-

conviction proceeding, not the time necessary t0 develop

it

text

.

.

.

to

the term “mentally retarded,” 146 Idaho at 722, but “intellectually

now the preferred nomenclature,

see, e.g.,

Hall

v.

Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014).

develop sufficient facts to file the post-conviction proceeding,” Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 727, is the
time it takes for the national consensus to emerge. Mr. Hairston waited for that moment to come
in the form of the ABA resolution, rendering his petition timely.
Another way to conceptualize why Mr. Hairston’s claim complies with the statute of
limitations is to apply the whole Pizzuto quote to his situation: “The reasonable time at issue is
the time necessary to develop sufficient facts to file the post-conviction proceeding, not the time
necessary to develop all facts that will be offered in an attempt to prove the claim.” Id. In the
case before the Court, the ABA resolution solidified the consensus and accordingly permitted
Mr. Hairston to file his petition, which he supported with the best evidence then at hand. See R.
130–38 (describing how the initial petition was accompanied by data provided by the Idaho
Department of Correction and newspaper articles, as they were the only sources that could be
located within such a short period of time). He then used the period allotted for amending his
petition to develop the facts, primarily by marshalling court documents to corroborate all of the
allegations he had made. See R. 718. Mr. Hairston acted diligently and just as the postconviction scheme intended him to. This is a far cry from a case where the predicate for a claim
was “knowable” earlier and simply had not yet been discovered through investigation. See
Fields, 155 Idaho at 535. Mr. Hairston’s claim only became knowable when the consensus
existed, and he promptly filed within forty-two days of that and, his limitations period satisfied,
then continued to develop the facts underlying his timely petition.
As another part of its effort to prove the claim was available earlier, the State quotes a
Fifth Circuit decision opining that it was only “commonsense” “that 18-to-20-year-olds tend to

10

be more impulsive than young adults aged 21 and over.” Ans. Br. at 15. Although Mr. Hairston
agrees with the State’s apparent insinuation that his petition is bolstered by commonsense,
commonsense has never been the metric by which evolving-standards claims are judged. Rather,
as spelled out in detail above, the test is whether there is a national consensus, and that is what
Mr. Hairston’s petition is based on.
Taking a different tack, the State objects to the use of the ABA resolution here because of
the Court’s previous commentary on the organization’s guidelines for capital defense lawyers.
See id. at 15. As an initial matter, the guidelines question is a red herring. The ABA resolution
at issue here is not a piece of guidance to capital defense lawyers on how best to represent their
clients, as the guidelines referenced by the State are. It is instead an acknowledgment by the
country’s foremost legal association that a certain practice is no longer consistent with our
central values as a society. The State has no authority or argument for why the Court can ignore
that type of document. It is an understandable omission, for—as stated earlier—the U.S.
Supreme Court explicitly relied upon an ABA resolution when it outlawed capital punishment
for those under fifteen. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830 & n.32 (characterizing an ABA
resolution on the issue as one of “the views that have been expressed by respected professional
organizations,” and germane to the constitutional question). That is demonstrably more on point
than the State’s tenuous references to attorney guidelines. Plus, the State’s position fails even on
its own terms. While this Court has declined in the State’s cited cases to expressly adopt such
guidelines, it presumably did not discount them altogether, as they have to be considered as a
matter of binding federal constitutional law. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524
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(2003) (reminding that the U.S. Supreme Court has “long referred” to the ABA standards “as
guides to determining what is reasonable”).
Lastly, it is important to examine the pernicious consequences of the State’s approach to
timeliness. It is the State’s perspective that the claim is both too early and too late. That is, the
State insists at the same time that the claim should have been brought earlier and that no national
consensus exists even now. If true, that would mean that Mr. Hairston was compelled to proffer
the claim at a historical moment when it was unsupported—and potentially even frivolous—only
to have it inevitably denied by the courts. Had he done so, and then later tried to raise the claim
again when new facts put it on firmer footing, there is little doubt that the State would have
wielded res judicata to defeat the claim for the very reason that it had been asserted earlier—a
doctrine the Attorney General has consistently depended on in similar circumstances, including
in Mr. Hairston’s own case. See, e.g., Hairston v. State, 144 Idaho 51, 58 (2007), vacated on
other grounds, 552 U.S. 1227 (2008); McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 707–08 (1999); Stuart
v. State (Stuart I), 118 Idaho 865, 867 (1990).
In the world dreamed up by the State, Mr. Hairston’s claim would be doomed no matter
where and when it was raised. Imagine that forty-nine states had enacted legislation forbidding
the execution of offenders between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, and that it happened
with five states every year starting the year of Mr. Hairston’s sentencing. If Mr. Hairston raised
the claim after the first five jurisdictions acted, the State would say it was premature because no
national consensus had arrived. If he raised the claim at any point thereafter, the State would say
it was barred by res judicata. And if he waited until later, the State would say it was untimely.
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Mr. Hairston’s first claim has two alternative bases: that national evolving standards
preclude his execution and that state-wide evolving standards do the same. He will speak to each
in turn.
1.

National Evolving Standards

The State’s first line of attack on the national-evolving-standards piece of Mr. Hairston’s
claim is to question this Court’s authority to independently interpret the U.S. Constitution, see
Ans. Br. at 21–23, a power that has been fundamental to its identity for the entirety of its
existence.
As support for its unusual take on this issue, the State principally relies on the U.S.
Supreme Court’s admonition that it brings to bear its “own judgment” in assessing the evolving
standards of decency. See id. at 22. The State reads this phraseology to mean that only the U.S.
Supreme Court’s judgment can codify an expansion of the evolving standards. See id. It takes
little effort to see the irrationality of the State’s interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court consults
its own judgment in its own cases by necessity. It is, after all, the Court deciding the case. The
Court obviously would not defer to the judgment of another tribunal. Yet that certainly does not
imply that other courts cannot consider their own judgment in adjudicating their own cases.
Roper proves the point. In the decision below there, the Missouri Supreme Court did
precisely what Mr. Hairston is advocating here. It recognized that the evolving standards of
decency had continued to grow since the U.S. Supreme Court’s latest pronouncement, and that
the age of eligibility for capital punishment had thereby increased under the Constitution. See
Roper, 543 U.S. at 559–60. Far from criticizing the state high court, Roper affirmed its ruling
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and quoted approvingly from its decision. See id. at 567. It is true, as the State stresses, that the
dissent in Roper complained about the Missouri Supreme Court’s independent exercise of its
own judgment. See Ans. Br. at 22. Nevertheless, at the risk of stating the obvious, a dissent is
not the law. The majority opinion is, and it had no problem with the fact that the state high court
did its job and interpreted the federal constitution by its own lights. As the Missouri Supreme
Court rightly stated in Roper itself, “decisions as to standards of decency are to be decided by
current standards, not ones of years ago” and “that is just what the issue before this Court
requires [it] to do: determine whether the evolving national consensus bars the imposition of the
death penalty . . . today, even though it did not bar it fourteen years ago.” Simmons v. Roper,
112 S.W.3d 397, 406–07 (Mo. 2003) (en banc); see Hall, 572 U.S. at 708 (reminding that the
Eighth Amendment “is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion
becomes enlightened by a humane justice”); Graham, 560 U.S. at 85 (“Society changes.”).
It is the State’s impression that Mr. Hairston is asking this tribunal to “overrule” the U.S.
Supreme Court. Ans. Br. at 22. He is not. Mr. Roper was seventeen at the time of his offense.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 555. The U.S. Supreme Court adheres to the principle that it is “never to
formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is
to be applied.” Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985). Sticking to that
approach, the Supreme Court in Roper decided only that it was unconstitutional to execute a
It had no occasion to consider an older defendant.
More significantly, Roper was decided on the basis of the data that was extant in 2005.
Nearly fifteen years later, the world has changed. To recognize the changes is in no way to
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imply that the U.S. Supreme Court erred at the time it ruled. See Sam Kamin, Infrequency as
Constitutional Infirmity, 51 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 95, 106 (2018) (“The determination of whether
death comports with contemporary societal norms is necessarily limited to the time at which it
was made.”). There is no difference between a consideration here of whether Roper extends to
older defendants and a consideration in any case of how U.S. Supreme Court precedent applies
to a new fact pattern. In the closely related context at issue in State v. Shanahan, 165 Idaho 343,
---, 445 P.3d 152, 158–59 (2019), cert. denied, --- S. Ct. ----, 2019 WL 6107870 (2019), for
instance, the Court concluded that Eighth Amendment law concerning juvenile life sentences can
be implicated in scenarios where the individual will ultimately be eligible for parole. It did so
even though the U.S. Supreme Court had only dealt with fixed life cases in that area. See id.; see
also id. at 164 (Brody, J., dissenting) (“I respectfully dissent from the Court’s decision to expand
the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012)” because “Miller
required this Court to re-examine fixed life sentences” and not “indeterminate sentences.”).
Bringing federal constitutional law to bear on novel facts is not, as the State conceives it,
improper. It is this Court’s own, unquestionable, independent duty. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389
U.S. 241, 248 (1967) (“[S]tate courts also have the solemn responsibility, equally with the
federal courts, . . . to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the
constitution of the United States.”).
The State makes a similar mistake when it contends that “[n]ot only has the Supreme
Court refused to expand Roper to murderers between the ages of 18 and 21, but just this last
spring the Court denied certiorari in a case asking the Court for such an expansion.” Ans. Br. at
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23. This sort of language suggests that the Supreme Court has held that developments since
Roper do not alter its holding. It hasn’t. The Supreme Court has never addressed that question
one way or another. And over the course of many years it has issued the “frequent admonition”
that “‘[t]he denial of a writ of certiorari imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the
case.’” North Carolina v. N.C. State Conference of the NAACP, 137 S. Ct. 1399, 1400 (2017)
(Roberts, C.J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (quoting United States v. Carver, 260 U.S. 482,
490 (1923)).
The State’s idea that the U.S. Supreme Court would resent a lower tribunal’s fresh
consideration of an important legal question deeply misunderstands the nature of the judicial
system. Contrary to that idea, the Supreme Court has “in many instances recognized that when
frontier legal problems are presented, periods of percolation in, and diverse opinions from, state
and federal appellate courts may yield a better informed and more enduring final pronouncement
by this Court.” Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see State
of Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., respecting the denial
of certiorari) (“It may be desirable to have different aspects of an issue further illumined by the
lower courts. Wise adjudication has its own time for ripening.”). The Supreme Court, and the
legal system as a whole, benefit from the considered analysis of an issue by different jurists. It
only stunts the law for courts to avoid an issue altogether, especially when the issue revolves
around circumstances that are by definition in flux.
Finding no succor on its misdirected federalism argument, the State proceeds to the
substance. Its first sally is to observe that no appellate court has, to date, expanded Roper in the
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direction Mr. Hairston is pushing for. See Ans. Br. at 23–25. Granted. Nonetheless, the absence
is not particularly compelling. As Mr. Hairston pointed out earlier, only two of the cases cited
by the State were decided after the pivotal ABA resolution came onto the scene, and neither of
them grappled in any fair or meaningful way with its significance. See supra at 8. For all intents
and purposes, the question presented here has not truly been answered by any of the decisions
arrayed by the State. It must be answered here in the first instance, and it should be answered in
Mr. Hairston’s favor.
Those preliminary objections dispensed with, the State has little to say about the heart of
Mr. Hairston’s claim: the powerful evidence of a societal shift away from death sentences for
late adolescents. The few points the State does have on that front are largely refuted by
unequivocal holdings by the U.S. Supreme Court. For starters, the State dismisses the import of
data about who is being executed and how old they are. See Ans. Br. at 26–27. That belief is not
shared by the Supreme Court, which has labeled “[s]tatistics about the number of executions”
one of the “measures of consensus.” Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 433.
Similarly, the State posits that gubernatorial moratoria on executions are not pertinent to
the inquiry. See Ans. Br. at 25. The Supreme Court disagrees. See Hall, 572 U.S. at 716
(counting states with moratoria in a capital evolving-standards case). And rightly so: governors
are selected by the people to represent their values, and when they halt the machinery of death,
that makes a telling statement about the sentiments of their constituents.
In one final departure from binding precedent, the State discounts international
developments regarding countries who oppose the death penalty in all instances, since they

18

supposedly d0 not shed any light 0n the age-cutoff question. See Ans. Br.

at 28.

Notwithstanding the State’s preferences, the U.S. Supreme Court has instructed that the analysis

must take

into account the jurisdictions that

of the consensus against”

its

have “abandoned the death penalty altogether as part

use against a particular age group, Roper, 543 U.S.

at 574,

and

that

includes international jurisdictions, see Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830. Whatever merits these

various notions 0f the State’s might have in a vacuum, the U.S. Supreme Court’s methodology

trumps them.

Even more tenuously,

the State recites a

t0 take part in various activities.

tell

us

little

in each

of them were

What

5

Laws

1972, ch.

t0 eighteen,

The

Where

§ 15-5-433(b) in

State situates

later

and have not been revisited

became Idaho Code

state militia);

Session

Laws

§

8, §

it

at 562.

The age

1971, ch. 21

is

the

1,

§

1

(passing Idaho

same now

as

it

was

1(lowering the age requirement for jury service in Idaho

1996 and

setting

0f Idaho

limits

See Session Laws 1927,

since.

remains today); Session Laws 1996, ch. 423, §

its list

State, the statutes

46-102 and establishing eighteen as the

concerning the making of wills, which

§ 15-2-501 in 1971,

Code

See Ans. Br. a 27—28.5 Unfortunately for the

set years ago,

age of eligibility for the

209

of Idaho statutes allowing eighteen-year—olds

about “contemporary standards 0f decency.” Roper, 543 U.S.

ch. 261, § 2 (creating

Session

list

1

Code

then);

Code

§ 2-

(promulgating Idaho

an age limit for conservatorship that has t0 date never

statutes in the section

see Ans. Br. at 27—28, so Mr. Hairston deals with

it

of its brief on the national standards,

under that

rubric. Insofar as the State is

asserting that the statutes go t0 Mr. Hairston’s Idaho-speciﬁc argument, they cannot serve that

ﬁmction—Mr. Hairston
punishment arena in

is

0n uniform sentencing practices from the
which these laws do not undermine.

relying there chieﬂy

particular,

19

capital

been amended); Session Laws 2004, ch. 127, § 1 (enacting Idaho Code § 18-1523(e) in 2004
with an age limit on tattooing and piercing that has not been altered thereafter); Session Laws
2007, ch. 30, § 2 (codifying, in 2007, an age limit for organ donation that remains in effect in
Idaho Code § 39-3404). The oldest of these provisions have been around for almost a century,
almost all have existed for decades, and none of them are truly new. A batch of laws that have
been on the books for so long without modification does not detract from “the consistency of the
direction of change” that Mr. Hairston has demonstrated. Roper, 543 U.S. at 566; accord Atkins,
536 U.S. at 315.
So, too, for the more general age limitations the State gets from Farmer v. State, 268 So.
3d 1009 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019). See Ans. Br. at 27. By the State’s own account, none of
those rules are new. They represent holdovers from an earlier era. Contrastingly, Mr. Hairston
pointed to continuing developments in the recognition of twenty-one as the better line between
adults and children. See Opening Brief, filed Aug. 28, 2019 (hereinafter “Opening Brief” or
“Opening Br.”) at 11–13. To name just a few examples, eligibility for juvenile court jurisdiction
and to buy cigarettes is increasingly being raised from eighteen to twenty-one. See id. at 12–13.
Likewise, the legalization of marijuana only began in 1996—the very year Mr. Hairston was
sentenced—and “the age of purchase has uniformly been set at twenty-one” in the various states
that have subsequently taken the plunge. Alexandra O. Cohen et al., When Does a Juvenile
Become an Adult? Implications for Law and Policy, 88 Temp. L. Rev. 769, 778 (2016).
Correspondingly, “[f]or many years, states varied their age-out age” for foster care “between
sixteen to twenty-one, with most setting the age at eighteen” and it has only been in the twenty-
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first century that “[m]ost states now have extended their age of aging out to twenty-one.”
Ramesh Kasarabada, Fostering the Human Rights of Youth in Foster Care: Defining Reasonable
Efforts to Improve Consequences of Aging Out, 17 CUNY L. Rev. 145, 153 (2013). This is
uniquely contemporary data that is tied with unique closeness to the time period most relevant to
the claim here.
In a nutshell, the evolution is all in Mr. Hairston’s favor. See Cruz v. United States, No.
3:11-cv-787, 2018 WL 1541898, at *22 (D. Conn. March 29, 2018) (“While there is no doubt
that some important societal lines remain at age 18, the changes discussed [in the ABA
resolution] reflect an emerging trend toward recognizing that 18-year-olds should be treated
different from fully mature adults.”).
A special comment is warranted with regard to the State’s emphasis on Idaho Code § 20509(1) and its provisions allowing juveniles fourteen and over to be treated as adults by the
criminal justice system. See Ans. Br. at 28. For one thing, a statute selecting fourteen as the cutoff point can hardly illuminate much when we already know from Roper that the relevant
constitutional minimum is at least eighteen. Section 20-509 (1) would at best support an
argument that fourteen-year-olds can be executed and that ship sailed more than thirty years ago,
when the U.S. Supreme Court proscribed the execution of those fifteen and under. See
Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838. For another thing, the State’s argument is circular. To rely on § 20509(1) is to essentially say that Idaho should be able to treat young defendants as adults because
Idaho treats young defendants as adults. That kind of tautological reasoning does not assist the
Court’s inquiry.
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The State’s appeal to non-binding cases from other jurisdictions fares no better. See Ans.
Br. at 23–25. Although the State depicts these eight cases as a mountain of precedent weighing
against Mr. Hairston’s Roper-extension claim, only one is actually apropos.
Initially, two of the cases are not Roper-extension decisions at all, for they involve noncapital matters. See United States v. Lopez-Cabrera, No. 1:11-cr-1032, 2015 WL 3880503, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2015), aff’d, 933 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 2019); Farmer, 268 So. 3d at 1009–10.
Next, the State misreads Otte v. State, 96 N.E.3d 1288 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017). The inmate
in that case attempted to skirt around Ohio’s established post-conviction scheme by instead
seeking declaratory relief. See id. at 1290–93. On appeal, the court’s holding was only that he
could not do so under Ohio procedural law. See id. Of course, Ohio law has no bearing here,
nor does the question of whether a declaratory-relief action would be a suitable vehicle for Mr.
Hairston’s claim—since he did not pursue one.
The State’s reliance on Mitchell v. State, 235 P.3d 640 (Okla. 2010), is equally
misplaced. Unlike Mr. Hairston, Mr. Mitchell did not argue for a categorical exclusion from
capital punishment, let alone raise a claim based on new evidence; rather, he contended that his
particular youthful qualities exempted him from the death penalty “in light of the mitigating
evidence he presented.” Id. at 658.
Continuing this theme, every case in the State’s long string-cite is distinguishable. In
United States v. Mitchell, 502 F.3d 931, 981 (9th Cir. 2007), the prisoner “offer[ed] no objective
indicia” of a national consensus, which Mr. Hairston has amply done more than ten years later.
Garcia v. Dir., TDCJ-CID, 73 F. Supp. 3d 693, 709–10 (E.D. Tex. 2014), COA denied, 793 F.3d

22

513 (5th Cir. 2015), involved the strict standards governing federal habeas review, which have
no purchase here. The court in Towles rejected a state-constitutional claim, leaving
unilluminated the Eighth Amendment issue that Mr. Hairston has presented. 208 A.3d at 1009.
When Thompson v. State, 153 So. 3d 84, 177–78 (Ala Crim. App. 2012), took up Roper, it was
in the context of a theory that the defendant’s “mental age” was that of a juvenile, which is not
Mr. Hairston’s theory.
That leaves the State with only one of the many cases on its over-inflated list: Foster,
from the Florida Supreme Court. Foster was wrongly decided for reasons spelled out earlier.
See supra at 14–17. More importantly, one solitary decision hardly manifests the kind of
overwhelming trend the State advertises. Recently, a state trial judge in Kentucky and a federal
appellate judge in Tennessee have both recognized that Roper’s cutoff must be adjusted upwards.
See Opening Br. at 5, 29 (discussing the Kentucky case and Pike v. Gross, 936 F.3d 372, 383–86
(6th Cir. 2019) (Stranch, J., concurring)). This is a brand-new issue, where much of the latest
scientific and legal evidence is of young vintage—which also, incidentally, sets the instant
appeal off from many of the cases in the State’s laundry list, dating as they do from 2007 and
including several decided a number of years ago. It would be unreasonable to have expected
more precedent to have accumulated when the consensus has just formed.
And in all events, this Court is free to choose whichever side is the sounder one in the
debate, no matter what the scorecard reads elsewhere. See, e.g., In re Cooke’s Estate, 96 Idaho
48, 52–54 (1973) (adopting “the rationale supporting the minority rule, as set forth in” a single
California case, instead of the approach taken by six other states). As exhaustively explained
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here and in the Opening Brief, Mr. Hairston has the better argument and that is reason enough to
rule in his favor. There is no magic number of other courts necessary to render a rule
constitutional. If it is constitutional, it must be applied.
In the alternative to all of the foregoing, if the Court adopts the State’s view that it cannot
extend the Eighth Amendment to ban the death penalty for nineteen-year-olds as a matter of
federal constitutional law, it undeniably has that ability under Article I, Section 6 of the Idaho
Constitution, and it should—for the same reasons surveyed here and in the Opening Brief—so
interpret that provision. See State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748 (1988) (“[I]n interpreting
provisions of our constitution that are similar to those of the federal constitution we are free to
extend protections under our constitution beyond those granted by the United States Supreme
Court under the federal constitution.”).
2.

Evolving Standards In Idaho

As with the national evolving standards, the State’s rebuttal on the Idaho-specific
component of the claim is both factually and legally erroneous.
The State’s misapprehensions begin at the outset, with the applicable legal framework.
To the State’s mind, Mr. Hairston’s theory only works if Idaho’s cruel-and-unusual provision is
construed as broader than its federal analogue. See Ans. Br. at 30. Not so. As elaborated in the
Opening Brief, because the Eighth Amendment calls for an evolving-standards test on a national
scale pursuant to federal constitutional law, and because Idaho’s cognate clause contains
identical language, the latter demands the same inquiry on a state-wide basis. See Opening Br. at
18–19. The state constitution need not be more generous than the federal one for the foregoing
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principles to hold true. They need only be equal. In that sense, Mr. Hairston’s claim fits
comfortably within the Court’s typical practice of applying Idaho’s cruel-and-unusual provision
so that it “track[s] the U.S. Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.” State v.
Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 599 (2011).
In an analogous situation in State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 13 (Conn. 2015), the court
pronounced the death penalty unlawful within its jurisdiction under the state constitution because
it had “become incompatible with contemporary standards of decency in Connecticut” in part
because of sentencing practices there. The court did so while continuing to hew to a prior
decision that “broadly adopted, as a matter of state constitutional law, th[e] federal framework
for evaluating challenges to allegedly cruel and unusual punishments.” Id. at 16. As in
Santiago, a holding that the adolescent death penalty offends the state constitution here is not a
departure from the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent. Quite the opposite: such a holding is
dictated by a faithful application of that precedent.
Additionally, the rarity of the adolescent death penalty in Idaho runs afoul not just of the
state constitution, but of the Eighth Amendment as well. When “young offenders” obtain
sentences so far out of the mainstream for their peers that it is like they were “struck by
lightning,” the penalties are cruel and unusual in the federal constitutional sense. Thompson, 487
U.S. at 833. The same principles apply when capital punishment in a particular state has become
“so wantonly and so freakishly imposed” due to the dynamics in that jurisdiction. Jones v.
Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1061 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 806 F.3d 538
(9th Cir. 2015). Idaho’s late-adolescent death sentence, which has not been meted out a single
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time since Mr. Hairston’s case, fits the bill to a tee, and it transgresses the federal constitution.
No holding about the state constitution of any kind, let alone one broadening it, is necessary to
reach that result.
The State’s response to the specific Idaho data is just as unpersuasive. On that score, the
State’s first salvo is to accentuate the fact that “the death penalty can still be imposed against 18
to 21 year-old murderers in each county” since “there have been no legislative enactments or
judicial decisions barring imposition of the death penalty in any Idaho county.” Ans. Br. at 32.
In terms of legislation, one must ask why lawmakers would spend their time on such a bill when
no adolescents are currently being sentenced to death or have been in the last two decades. See
Opening Br. at 19. Given the absence of any state-wide problem, the absence of legislation is
hardly telling. Legislators are not in the business of coming up with solutions for non-existent
issues. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 (recognizing that “there is little need to pursue legislation
barring the execution” of a particular class of people when they are not actively being executed).
As Graham recognized, jurisdictions that technically permit a type of sentence but do “not
impose the punishment should not be treated as if they have expressed the view that the sentence
is appropriate.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 67. That is precisely the case with Idaho’s counties and
adolescent death sentences.
As for judicial decisions, the rejoinder is to the same effect: Mr. Hairston is the only one
who has ever raised the claim, and he is doing so in the very case before the Court. The silence
of the courts does not mean they favor the State. It means only that the issue is arising for the
first time now.
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Curiously, the State portrays Mr. Hairston’s claim as a challenge to prosecutorial
discretion. See Ans. Br. at 32. In fact, it is the opposite. Mr. Hairston is not contesting the
decisions by county prosecutors—he is championing them. Their overwhelming tendency to shy
away from capital charges against late adolescents is a vindication of Mr. Hairston’s claim, and
he does not contest it in the slightest.
The State expresses skepticism of the notion that prosecutorial decisions can substantiate
an evolving-standards claim. See id. (“Hairston has provided no authority for the proposition
that, because individual county prosecutors exercised their discretion and declined to seek the
death penalty, the death penalty as applied to 18 to 21 year-olds is unconstitutional.”). Its
uncertainty is easily resolved with a glance at the U.S. Supreme Court’s caselaw, which has
instructed on this very issue that “the judgments of . . . prosecutors weigh heavily in the
balance.” Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833. That stands to reason. Prosecutors, and particularly
elected ones like many of Idaho’s, are physically and politically close to the citizens for whom
they work. They are well-situated to reflect the values of those citizens, and when they
uniformly avoid a certain practice it can fairly be assumed that is because it “is inconsistent with
basic principles of decency.” Graham, 560 U.S. at 82. That is presumably why the U.S.
Supreme Court asks how many defendants in the class at issue have been sentenced to death, not
how the others happened to receive lesser penalties. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833.
What’s more, whenever a court considers whether a certain type of death sentence is
compatible with the evolving standards, it consults “the infrequency of its use even where it
remains on the books.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 567. “And if we are searching for actors besides the
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jury who can cause a significant case-by-case drop in the death penalty rate by their actions
alone, prosecutors must be the primary focus.” Scott E. Sundby, The Death Penalty’s Future:
Charting the Crosscurrents of Declining Death Sentences and the McVeigh Factor, 84 Tex. L.
Rev. 1929, 1948 (2006). This is so because “the prosecutor controls the initial decision over
whether to seek the death penalty and, later, whether to accept or reject a plea that avoids a death
sentence,” making his conduct “probably the most influential of any actor in affecting death
sentencing rates.” Id. Because the U.S. Supreme Court’s precedent places a premium on the rate
at which death sentences are imposed, and because prosecutors shape that rate, their
decisionmaking has a constitutional place in the analysis. That is especially so in Idaho. A death
sentence here is only handed out when the prosecutor notices his intent to go after one. See
Idaho Code § 18-4504A. Prosecutors are, more than anyone, accurate barometers of Idaho’s
appetite for the death penalty.
Consider the ramifications of the State’s position to the contrary. What if there were five
first-degree murders by late adolescents every year in every Idaho county for twenty-five years,
and the prosecutors in every case opted not to pursue death? There would then be 5,500
consecutive non-death sentences. As the State sees things, that would reflect no state-wide
consensus, because prosecutors were the ones steering the process away from death, even though
they are presumably chosen for their jobs because they follow the mores of their constituents.
That would not be rational, and the State’s model is a poorly constructed one.
The State’s ironic strategy of discounting the choices made by county prosecutors would
be problematic for Mr. Hairston’s claim if any other decision-maker in the state was acting in a
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contrary fashion. But they are not. When Idaho judges have been in a position to sentence
young defendants to death, they have—like prosecutors—declined to do so. Strikingly, they
refrained from resorting to capital punishment with explicit reference to the defendants’ youth as
one of the reasons for their leniency. See R. 425 (stating in the Lundquist case that the “Court
had, prior to sentencing, advised counsel for both parties that it did not view the death penalty as
a valid sentencing option in view of the age of the defendant at the time the murder was
committed” even though the prosecution had pursued death); accord State v. Lundquist, 134
Idaho 831, 837 (2000) (“The maximum sentence available to the district court in this case was an
order of execution as capital punishment. However the court concluded it was not an appropriate
case to impose the death sentence.”); R. 519 (declining to impose death in the Thurman case, in
part because the defendant “was barely

at the time of the commission of

the crime, and a rather immature eighteen at that,” which was “a significant factor” in
considering the sentence). Simply stated, the relevant decision-makers are in complete accord
that death sentences for late-adolescent defendants are no longer harmonious with Idaho values.
The State is laboring under the further misapprehension that, of the dozens of first-degree
murder cases that have been brought against late adolescents in Idaho in the last two decades and
led to non-death sentences, “only one” “involved a murder where a statutory aggravating factor
was present.” Ans. Br. at 32. From that, the Attorney General seemingly draws the inference
that such defendants are receiving life sentences because of the facts of their crimes, not because
of a consensus against the state-sanctioned killing of young offenders. The premise is flawed,
fatally undermining the resulting conclusion. Idaho’s statutory aggravators come into play only
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when the prosecutor is pursuing capital punishment. See Idaho Code § 19-2515(9) (“The
following are statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one (1) of which must be found to
exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can be imposed . . . .”). In the vast
majority of the cases relied upon by Mr. Hairston, the prosecutor elected not to seek death. As a
consequence, the sentencer had no occasion to pass upon whether any aggravators were present
or not. The absence of such findings is an outgrowth of the fact that Idaho prosecutors are
overwhelmingly refraining from capitally charging late-adolescent first-degree murder
defendants, which is one of the central planks of Mr. Hairston’s argument. By drawing attention
to that gap, the State is only strengthening Mr. Hairston’s claim.
And as referenced above, in the few cases where prosecutors have pursued death
sentences against such defendants, it is judges who have refrained from imposing them,
indicating that the system has through one actor or another expressed its condemnation of the
practice. Notably, one of those judges did find a capital aggravator, see R. 516, before opting for
life partly because of the defendant’s youth, see R. 519. Plainly, it is not the absence of
aggravators that has moved Idaho away from executing the young—it is society’s disapproval of
the practice.
In addition, in the cases where death was not sought, it surely could have been had the
prosecutors involved been so inclined. Per Idaho law, the existence of a single statutory
aggravator can sustain a death sentence. See Idaho Code § 19-2515(9). Idaho has a capital
aggravator for several relatively common types of first-degree murders, including those where
the killing involved multiple victims; where it was done for payment; and where it accompanied
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robbery. See § 19-2515(9)(b), (d), (g). As set forth in Mr. Hairston’s Opening Brief, there are
offenses in each of those categories involving defendants in his age cohort who wound up with
life sentences. See Opening Br. at 23–25. There can be no serious debate that all of those
defendants were legally eligible for capital punishment, i.e., they would have faced capital
charges if their prosecutors had wanted them to.
Idaho also has three exceptionally amorphous capital aggravators—to wit, one for
“heinous, atrocious or cruel” (“HAC”) murders, § 19-2515(9)(e), one for when the accused
displays an “utter disregard for human life,” § 19-2515(9)(f), and one for when the defendant has
shown “a propensity to commit murder,” § 19-2515(9)(i). As a recent dissenting opinion from
this Court perceptively put it, the HAC aggravator has no natural limiting principle, since
“[a]rguably, every person convicted of murder has committed a crime one would consider
horrible” and “atrocious,” and “most consider any murder an ‘utter disregard’ for human life.”
State v. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 839–40 (2018) (Kidwell, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct.
1618 (2019); accord Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 364 (1988) (“To say that something
is ‘especially heinous’ merely suggests that the individual jurors should determine that the
murder is more than just ‘heinous,’ whatever that means, and an ordinary person could honestly
believe that every unjustified, intentional taking of human life is ‘especially heinous.’”). Mr.
Hairston concedes that these propositions from Hall were offered in dissent, as the majority
upheld the aggravators against constitutional vagueness assaults. Still, regardless of whether the
aggravators are so broad as to be unconstitutional, they are unquestionably broad enough for a
prosecutor to allege them in any first-degree murder case he chooses to. In that regard, all of
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Mr. Hairston’s non-death cases were potentially capital, and all of them reflect a consensus not
to execute youthful defendants.
At a bare minimum, no one could deny that prosecutors might well have sought death
under the HAC aggravator for a murder where the defendant “inflicted a protracted beating in
which the victim was terrorized and tortured” and “taunted and mocked his victim”; a murder
where the victim was beaten to death by a baseball bat and a large wrench; a murder where the
defendant beat a child to death; and a murder where the victim was kicked, struck with rocks,
and thrown off a cliff. See Opening Br. at 23 (reciting all of those facts with reference to the
particular cases involved). Each of those cases could easily have been prosecuted capitally.
None of them were. That, along with the complete absence of any death sentence for a person in
the relevant age range, is strong evidence of a state-wide consensus.
In a last-ditch maneuver to evade the strength of Mr. Hairston’s claim by
mischaracterizing its jurisprudential origin, the State critiques the theory as “more akin to
proportionality analysis, which the Supreme Court long ago reasoned is not constitutionally
required.” Ans. Br. at 33. In the case cited by the State, the Supreme Court drew a line between
proportionality review “in the traditional sense,” i.e., an inquiry into whether a punishment is
“inherently disproportionate, and therefore cruel and unusual, when imposed for a particular
crime or category of crime,” as opposed to a different mode of proportionality review, which
evaluates whether a particular punishment is “unacceptable in a particular case because
disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime.” Pulley v.
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Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43 (1984). Pulley relieved state courts of having to engage in the latter,
while leaving the former line of cases untouched. See id. at 43–44.
Contrary to the State’s mislabeling, Mr. Hairston’s claim falls neatly within the classic
family of proportionality cases, which later grew to include Roper itself. See 543 U.S. at 571
(“Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and
immaturity.”). That precedent is alive and well, and Mr. Hairston’s claim entails a
straightforward application of it. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016)
(“The concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.”). To be sure, a
comparison between Mr. Hairston’s case and others is called for, as it illustrates Idaho’s
evolution beyond the extermination of the young by demonstrating that the development has
been driven by the age of the defendants and not the nature of the offenses. Even so, that does
not alter the essence of Mr. Hairston’s claim, which is that a consensus has formed against such
executions, situating his case squarely within an old and vibrant series of Supreme Court
precedents.
Evidence of the consensus continues to mount as we speak. In State v. Coleman, Idaho
Sup. Ct., No. 46772, the Court has before it proof that yet another adolescent convicted of firstdegree murder was spared the death penalty. The relevant documents are at pages 19–20, 78–79,
and 371-73 of the clerk’s record in that case. Collectively, they demonstrate that Mr. Coleman
was nineteen at the time of the offense, that he was convicted of first-degree murder, and that he
was sentenced to forty years fixed. To the extent it is necessary, Mr. Hairston respectfully asks
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that is

now

entirely

the

inconsistent with the punishment meted out to every other defendant in his age bracket to be
charged since then.
3.

The District Court Applied The Wrong Standard

In his Opening Brief, Mr. Hairston exposed how the district court went astray by
employing “a presumption in favor of the” State that is only properly triggered when a litigant is
targeting the constitutionality of a statute, which he has not done. See Opening Br. at 25–27.
The State now weakly defends the district court’s misplaced methodology. See Ans. Br. at 33–
34. Its first strategy is to seek refuge under Stuart II. See id. at 33–34. The case is unavailing.
In Stuart II, the petitioner was questioning the constitutionality of a statute—in particular, Idaho
Code § 19-2719, the provision governing capital post-conviction litigation. See 149 Idaho at 40.
Mr. Hairston, to repeat, is not. The State’s comparison does not withstand even the briefest
scrutiny.
With no precedent to help it, the State falls back on the convoluted reasoning that Mr.
Hairston’s theory “is governed by the same standards as those involving the constitutionality of a
statute because he is contending that the state and federal constitutions do not permit the
imposition of the death penalty involving 18 to 21 year-old murderers.” Ans. Br. at 34. “In
other words,” the State tries to clarify, Mr. Hairston “is asking this Court to interpret the state
and federal constitutions to prohibit the imposition of the death penalty for 18 to 21 year-old
murderers, which is the same as having this Court interpret whether a statute permits the
execution of such murderers.” Id. Mr. Hairston confesses that he cannot make heads or tails of
the State’s argument. The State has not identified a statute whose constitutionality Mr. Hairston
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is protesting. Nor has it supplied a single case in which this Court applied the presumption at
issue in the absence of such a statute. Its argument boils down to the notion that a general
constitutional claim is similar to a challenge to a statute because the State thinks they are similar.
That is hardly convincing, and there is nothing in the Court’s precedent to substantiate it.
Despite the State’s best efforts, it fails to rehabilitate the district court’s erroneous test,
and reversal or remand remain appropriate.
C.

Mr. Hairston’s Death Sentence Is Unconstitutional Because The Mitigating
Factors Associated With His Youth Were Not Given Proper Consideration

Nearly everything in the preceding sections of this reply brief applies with equal measure
to Mr. Hairston’s second claim—that his youth received constitutionally inadequate attention at
sentencing. He will not dwell on the same arguments further, and will focus here only on
refuting the handful of points by the State that are specific to the second claim.
To begin, the State endeavors to limit the caselaw underlying Claim Two to the lifesentence context and wall them off from the capital arena. See Ans. Br. at 39 (“[N]o court has
expanded Miller or Montgomery to murderers between 18 and 21 that have also been sentenced
to death.”). The distinction is unsound. Miller flows from the “foundational principle” that the
“imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though
they were not children.” 567 U.S. at 474. Death is self-evidently an even more severe
punishment than life without the possibility of parole. If the Eighth Amendment applies to the
former, it a fortiori applies to the latter. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (“Because the death penalty
is the most severe punishment, the Eighth Amendment applies to it with special force.”).
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On a more granular level, the State misses the legal import of People v. House, --- N.E.
3d ---, 2019 WL 2718457 (Ill. Ct. App. 2019), in several respects. The first is to suggest that
House somehow has less bearing here because it homed in on Miller for its inspiration rather
than Montgomery. See Ans. Br. at 39. So what? In its most salient sentence, the House court
wrote that “[a]lthough the Court in Roper delineated the division between juvenile and adult at
18, we do not believe that this demarcation has created a bright line rule.” 2019 WL 2718457, at
*12. House went on to apply the U.S. Supreme Court’s juvenile caselaw to a first-degree murder
defendant who was nineteen at the time of the offense. See id. at *12–14. That is precisely what
Mr. Hairston is lobbying for here. No matter what precedent it cited, the reasoning in House is
spot-on and weighs in favor of Mr. Hairston’s claim.
The State’s second misstep on House is to become distracted by the fact that the court
there was construing the Illinois Constitution rather than the Eighth Amendment. See Ans. Br. at
39–40. As before, the substance of the reasoning is what counts, and it supports relief here.
The State’s final blunder on House is to attribute significance to the Illinois Supreme
Court’s vacatur of an earlier version of the decision. See id. But it is the post-vacatur iteration
that Mr. Hairston relied upon in his Opening Brief, see Opening Br. at 33, and it is still good law
in Illinois. The prior remand is neither here nor there. And if there is something more on-point
about the intermediate court’s earlier opinion, then there is in any event nothing stopping this
tribunal from using it as persuasive authority. This Court is not bound by any judicial opinions
from Illinois, regardless of their source, so it can pick and choose the decisions it finds most
deserving.
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Apart from House, Mr. Hairston relied in his Opening Brief on Cruz. See Opening Br. at
33. Lacking any ground for distinguishing Cruz, since it directly supports Mr. Hairston’s claim,
the State complains that it represents the isolated view of a single judge and that “every other
court has rejected an extension of Miller.” Ans. Br. at 40. Of course, that is untrue. As just
noted, House effectively created such an extension. More to the point, this is a fast-moving,
cutting-edge area of the law. The ABA resolution that symbolizes a turning point on the issue
only went into force last year, and very few courts have had an opportunity to consider its
significance. See supra at 8. It is also noteworthy that attorneys general around the country
have, like their peers here, advanced the argument that state judges are powerless to move the
constitutional age limits in the cruel-and-unusual context until the U.S. Supreme Court does.
Even though the argument is specious, see supra at 14–17, it has met with some success
elsewhere. See, e.g., Foster, 258 So. 3d at 1254. It is not equitable for attorneys general to
artificially create stagnancy in an area of law and then use that very stagnancy as a justification
for keeping things the way they are.
To top things off, it is misleading for the State to ask “how there can be a national
consensus when every other court has rejected an extension of Miller.” Ans. Br. at 40. Aside
from the fact that it is false to say that every court has so ruled, the State’s question confuses the
nature of the consensus at issue. It is not a consensus among courts. It is a consensus among
society, as evidenced most prominently by the views of the scientific community, “respected
professional organizations” like the ABA, Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830 & n.32, and the legal
system. Those are the sources Mr. Hairston has assembled here, and they justify relief.
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Roper confirms that the small number of favorable decisions on Mr. Hairston’s claim is
no impediment to relief. There, the petitioner alerted the state supreme court to a single judicial
decision forbidding the use of the juvenile death penalty, and even that decision did not do so
because of any nationwide consensus. See Petitioner’s Brief, Simmons v. Luebbers, 112 S.W.3d
397 (Mo. 2003) (No. SC 84454), 2003 WL 24219767, at *76–77 (discussing State v. Furman,
858 P.2d 1092 (Wash. 1993)). That did not stop the Missouri Supreme Court from finding such
a consensus, nor the U.S. Supreme Court from affirming. See Simmons, 112 S.W.3d at 406–13;
see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 560–79. Atkins is to the same effect. The petitioner in that case did
not cite a single decision finding a national consensus against executing the intellectually
disabled. See Brief for Petitioner, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (No. 00-8452), 2001
WL 1663817. Yet as revealed by the U.S. Supreme Court a few months later, the consensus was
there. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311–21. Simply put, the reluctance of some courts to recognize
new facts on the ground does not change the constitutional reality.
It is not too surprising that courts have been slow to embrace the scientific and societal
developments around late adolescents. Courts are cautious, and that is often for the best.
Sometimes, society gets ahead of the courts. Here, it has done so, and this Court is now in a
position to give constitutional recognition to a fact that society has already accepted: that it is
barbaric to execute people for acts they committed when they were too young for us to trust them
with alcohol. Like the Missouri Supreme Court in Roper, history would congratulate this
tribunal for its foresight, courage, and fidelity to the law if it so ruled.
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